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Summary   
 
This paper analyses the role of corporate governance failures and weaknesses in the 
global financial crisis with reference to the evolution of post-crisis corporate 
governance arrangements in China. The current crisis presents China with an 
opportunity to analyse its governance problems, reflect on its weaknesses and 
implement a strategy to address areas which need attention. This paper opens with a 
description of China’s exposure to the current global financial crisis and continues to 
critically evaluate the effectiveness of a free market system on corporate governance. 
Bratton (2002) maintains that incentive structures that motivate the self-regulatory 
systems generate less powerful checks against abuse than scholars and practitioners 
have believed. The paper highlights the need for corporate regulatory bodies and 
policy makers to revise and re-develop financial services sector regulations. Finally, 
the paper discusses the need of ethics in organizations - an issue that is beyond 
legislation.  
 
In an increasingly interconnected global economy, it is imperative to increase our 
understanding of what constitutes an effective corporate governance system. The 
paper contributes to the corporate governance body of literature within the Chinese 
context by providing insights into the contributing factors to corporate governance 
failure that led to the global financial crisis. It also provides policy recommendations 
for China’s policy makers to seriously consider.  The results suggest a need for the re-
examination of corporate governance adequacy and the institutionalisation of business 
ethics.  
Main body 
Contrary to most global crises in recent decades rooted in developing and emerging 
economies due to abrupt reversals in capital flows and loose domestic monetary and 
fiscal policies (Mohan, 2009), the current global financial crisis originated in the U.S. 
and spread quickly to the rest of the world. China’s economy has not been immune to 
the effects of the global financial crisis given its heavy reliance on trade and foreign 
direct investment (FDI) for its economic growth (Morrison, 2009). Issues arose such 
as a drop in GDP, high inflation, a sharp slowdown in industrial profit growth and 
fiscal income, the poorest performing stock market in history and high unemployment 
(Ljungwall, 2008). The crisis has hit the manufacturing and financial service sectors 
particularly hard (Morrison, 2009). Scholars (Barker, 2009, Clarke and Klettner, 2009) 
now believe that the causes of the global financial crisis are multidimensional - loose 
monetary policy, excessive credits, low interest rates, unsatisfactory functioning of 
credit rating agencies and inappropriate rewards incentives in modern finance. 
Consequently, the economic downturn and ineffectiveness of market mechanisms 
eroded investors’ confidence.  
 
The crisis that sparked in 2008 has exposed a variety of significant corporate 
governance failures – the dysfunction of market mechanisms, inadequate supervision, 
lack of transparency and accountability, misaligned compensation arrangements that 
encouraged management short-termism, poor risk management, as well as some 
fraudulent schemes. The meltdown of high-profile companies, such as Lehman 
Brothers, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the U.S. suggests that the corporate 
governance mechanisms by themselves may not be adequate to monitor, control and 
discipline business affairs. Based on the concept of market capitalism, the Anglo-
Saxon governance system is founded on the belief that self-interest and de-centralised 
markets can function in a self-regulating manner (Cernat, 2004). The reinforcement of 
profit-oriented behavior and a struggle for material success have shaped the practice 
of short-term shareholder value maximisation behaviour (Moerland, 1995). Current 
crisis raises a significant doubt regarding the effectiveness of “American style” 
corporate governance system in serving its stated purpose, to safeguard shareholders 




The corporate governance system in China was modeled on the Anglo-Saxon system 
practiced within the U.S./U.K that promotes the free market system in a self-
regulating manner. In his book The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith (1776)  positioned 
that a free and competitive market economy enables corporations to efficiently and 
effectively use society’s resources in creating value and market mechanisms prevent 
corporations from abusing their power and defrauding their stakeholders. However, 
Smith (1776:50) was aware of some of the limitations of “free” markets and that 
markets, by themselves, often destroy the possibility of a decent human existence 
‘unless government takes pains to prevent’ that from happening. Former Chairman of 
the Federal Reserve Bank, Alan Greenspan, during his leadership presumed that the 
self-interests of organizations were best capable of protecting their own shareholders 
and equity of the firm (Mertzanis, 2009). The turmoil, however, indicates that the 
consequence of the laissez-faire philosophy that allowed financial services to innovate 
and use high leverage has created a complex system prone to risks and fraud (Spitzer, 
2009). Investment banks traded heavily on their accounts. For example, Merrill Lynch 
is one of the most leveraged companies, which is using about $30 billion of equity to 
finance $1 trillion of assets (Economist, 2008). When the markets are rising, gearing 
like that creates stellar returns on equity (Economist, 2008). In the falling market, a 
small fall in asset values can wipe out shareholders. 
 
The Chinese government has gradually relaxed its control in financial service sectors 
during the recent economic reforms (Lu et al., 2009). The opening up of Chinese 
financial markets and relaxing monetary and fiscal policies may encourage large scale 
companies to engage in speculations in securities and real estates markets that create 
the possibility of asset bubble. China’s unique business culture and development 
history would suggest that market-driven corporate governance may not be enough to 
enforce good practice although the market-oriented model is more effective in 
assuring adequate control (Liu, 2005). China is in its early stage of corporate 
governance reform. The external control mechanisms, such as a well functioning 
stock market and legal systems, are still in their embryonic stage. Further de-
regulation is likely to cause more severe problems in China. The institutional and 
legal environment in China is substantively different from that of the U.S. and U.K. 
Despite improvements to date, China still has a weak legal system with overly strong 
influence of private connections, the “guanxi” (Braendle et al., 2005). Yuan and Yuan 
(2007) suggest that China’s corporate governance effectiveness ranks last amongst 
nine countries in East Asia, despite Chinese corporate governance laws and 
regulations ranking highest. A strong and enforceable legal system needs to support 
an effective corporate governance mechanism (Spitzer, 2009). When the penalties for 
irregularities are not severe enough, China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
has met many practical difficulties in the course of law enforcement, including 
complications in seeking evidence, lack of the means to enforce the law and the 
cooperation of other judicial departments (Lu, 2006). Weak law enforcement results 
from the lack of an independent judiciary, a weak legal culture and powerless 
enforcement systems (Lin, 2004). Without an effective law enforcement system 
regarding the securities market, insider trading and market manipulation frequently 
occur in China (Lu, 2006). Wolfensohn (2002) notes that the implementation of an 
effective law enforcement system will be increasingly challenging and will require 
change of roles and behaviours by institutions, enterprises and individuals, faced with 
new rules and new incentives. An evolution towards stronger legal protection for 
investors will lead to more successful corporate governance systems and greater 
economic development (Jing et al., 2004). In turn, more effective regulation will 
require increased enforcement capability for regulatory bodies, which means greater 
reliance on legal instruments and the ability to enforce them (Wolfensohn, 2002). 
With stronger market regulation, we can minimise the problems of the quality of 
judges, weak enforcement of judgments, government interference and corruption. 
 
 
Apart from the weak legal system, the deficiencies in China’s capital markets may 
explain other corporate governance inefficiencies. For example, the falsification of 
earnings and misappropriation of funds are prevalent amongst parent companies 
(Takeshi, 2007). Seventy percent of the companies listed on China’s domestic market 
do not meet international standards in terms of profits, returns and other indicators 
(Cheng, 2007, Takeshi, 2007). China’s poor performing stock index illustrates that the 
stock market is illiquid, inefficient and unreliable; however, this bears little 
correlation to China’s underlying economic growth (Cai, 2007). From 2001 to 2005, 
the Shanghai and Shenzhen indexes were the world’s worst performing markets out of 
77 major benchmarks and the total market value of China’s capital market shrank 
30.7% from 2003 to the end of 2005 due to investor’s disappointment in the market 
despite a lack of change in market fundamentals (Cai, 2007). There is actually no 
outside market mechanism for corporate control because share prices fail to indicate 
an enterprise’s value. Shareholders of non-tradable shares have been unable to sell 
their shareholding on the stock markets and therefore have been indifferent to the 
prices of tradable shares (Takeshi, 2007). 
 
Investors in China’s domestic stock markets remain unsophisticated with individual 
investors characterised as gambling on a quick increase in share prices (Cooper, 2002, 
Jiang et al., 2008). Compared with only 38 per cent in the US, China’s individual 
investors account for two-thirds of the trading in China’s stock market (Jiang et al., 
2008) with an average two months holding period (Wang, 2004). These investors are 
highly speculative and lack incentives to monitor company behaviour, thus investors 
popularly blame a collapse in stock prices on the government (Cooper, 2002). 
Investors operate on a hearsay basis and are usually in the market for short-term gains 
(Leung et al., 2002). Holding underperforming local companies has adversely affected 
these investors since potentially higher earnings induces many valuable Chinese 
companies to list overseas (Beltratti and Bortolotti, 2006). Companies broadly do not 
understand that they owe their primary duty of care to their investors and that they 
need to optimise resources allocation (Li and Liu, 2006). Consequently, they have 
undermined and almost destroyed the basic function of the capital market (Li and Liu, 
2006). Additionally, China’s capital markets lack real blue-chip stocks with high 
profitability and, as such, investors are overwhelmed with small-capitalisations 
(Wang, 2004:12). China’s Premier, Wen Jiabao, felt remorseful and sympathetic to 
investors in remarks bemoaning the collapse of China's stock markets and he blamed 
China’s lack of know-how and experience, along with inadequate stock-market 
regulations (People's Daily, 2005). 
 
 
The global financial crisis may lead to legislative changes in China regarding 
corporate governance. However, adopting new regulation is one thing; whether the 
reforms actually change the way boards operate is another (Lawler and Finegold, 
2005). China needs to improve in areas beyond legislation. Tenev and Zhang (2002) 
suggest that the corporate governance failures in both emerging and developed 
markets indicate that there is no perfect corporate governance system. Organizations 
cannot merely legislate good corporate governance systems because there is no 
singular model or a perfect system (Gonzalez., 2007, Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 
2008, Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2009). Corporate governance involves tradeoffs 
between competing goals (i.e. the shareholder maximisation or long-term 
sustainability of the firm or that of an entire economy and thus, can only ever achieve 
“second best” options (Wong et al., 2005). China must develop a corporate 
governance system that makes sense from a capital markets point of view and from a 
sociological and ideological point of view (Voß and Xia, 2006). We also must 
understand the incentives of the decision makers in order to improve corporate 
governance technical mechanisms and measures. The Chinese government needs to 
continue building trust in the Chinese people and further develop its unique market 
economy model. The Chinese government must use an effective communications 
mechanism in order to generate trust and openness in the boardroom (OECD, 2007, 
Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2008, Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2009). Rather than 
proclaiming a universal mode of corporate governance, the government needs to 
locate its understandings of a particular economy with its specificities (O’Sullivan, 
2000). A better understanding of how individuals behave in the real world may, at the 
very least, improve the chances of preventing future corporate disasters (Marnet, 
2007). China needs to continually develop, adapt and rewrite corporate governance 
practices capable of meeting the new challenge and pay attention to individual and 
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